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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to present the concept of the ‘Multi-Communal Security Force’ and key 
considerations for future policy design on the issue in Cyprus. The complex political situation is 
constitutive of heavy military presence of six armies: the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the Hellenic 
Force of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces Command, the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern 
Cyprus, the British Forces of Cyprus, and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Changes 
made to this ‘defence-setting’ will result out of significant peace developments at the political level. 
Such changes will inevitably touch deeply the sense of ontological security of the two Cypriot 
communities. The concept of Multi-Communal Security Force (MCSF) is developed out of (1) a 
comparative analysis with other post-conflict societies – South Africa and Lebanon – who successfully 
shared military power by integrating former antagonist groups. I also built on reflections from previous 
(2) empirical research on militarism, masculinity and nationalism in Cyprus, (3) policy work for the 
Cyprus Ministry of Defense, and (4) for the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, as well as from 
(5) evaluation and assessment of the defence institutions of Cyprus with Transparency International. 
Today, the plans for whether the united Cyprus will have an army or not – and what form that army will 
take – remain unclear. Therefore, this article provides early stage policy indications for the Multi-
Communal Security Force. If following the peace negotiations it is decided that an army will be 
established, it will be significant to inform policy-makers through well-researched policy 
recommendations of the practical as well as cultural arrangements that would position the army as an 
exemplary model of peace and effective co-existence. In doing so, I propose for the current armies of the 
two Cypriot communities to be integrated into a force that cares about security for all. 
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1 Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this article is to present the concept of the ‘Multi-Communal Security Force’ and key 
considerations for future policy design. In Cyprus, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities 
have suffered greatly because of the armed forces on the island both in and outside of armed conflict. 
Today, the plans for whether the united Cyprus will have an army or not – and if it does what form that 
army will have – remain unclear. Moreover, the issue of how security will be formed, following a 
solution to the Cyprus Problem, is a major issue for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Lordos 2009). If it 
is judged necessary for an army to exist, it is then significant to inform policy-makers through 
researched policy recommendations of the practical and cultural arrangements that would position the 
army as an exemplary model of peace and effective co-existence.   
Following a settlement to the Cyprus Problem, each state-institution will need to be designed as a 
pillar of peace and reconciliation. The army, a most central institution of the state, could bring about a 
united ground for co-existence. Therefore, sharing the vision as well as the responsbility for security is of 
utmost importance for creating a long-lasting Federal Republic of Cyprus.  
Presently, very little has been said about the security forces of the united Cyprus. A federal police 
force, which will be made up of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, seems to be an idea largely accepted 
by both communities. Moreover, the possibility for a united bi-communal security force is currently 
present in the negotiations yet is still hugely underdeveloped, whilst the option of not having a military 
force has also been mentioned (To Bhma 2016). Therefore, this work aims to be a basis for policy-
design, given that an army is to be created.  
‘Military force’ is an issue of particular sensitivity in the context of the settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem, because the island has long suffered the presence of six standing armies. Moreover, the two 
communities have been traumatized by continuing paramilitary conflict throughout the 1950s and 60s. 
Later on, the war in 1974 resulted in partitioning the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities: a military 
guarded separation with political discourses installing fear as a necessity for its existence. The bi-
communal hostilities were thus followed by the military antagonism created against the Green Line from 
both sides of the divide. Moreover, all six armies had their role in constructing the militarized landscape 
of Cyprus. These are: the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the Hellenic Force of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot 
Security Forces Command, the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus, the British Forces of Cyprus 
and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Years have passed since the partition – and not 
one single military incident. Yet in the ‘imagination’ (Anderson 1983) of both Cypriot communities war 
is close as it lies entrenched within the collective memories of the past. 
In a united Cyprus, therefore, the multi-communal army will be a function of peace and co-
existence at both cultural and institutional levels. Institutions play a key role in developing a 
lasting culture of peace. The army is a state-institution central in the process of peace. It should 
therefore serve as a pillar of inter-culturality and reconciliation, setting a concrete example of a multi-
communal state: functioning and prospering for all Cypriot communities. 
Cyprus today, just as South Africa and Lebanon in the past, presents a particularly complex 
process of militarism – (1) consisting of several armies (2) a long-standing history of conflict as 
well as (3) having communities that have lived separated from each other within the country. In 
the cases of South Africa and Lebanon the goal and challenge has been to create an army that will 
constitute a platform of unity between groups marked by difference or in conflict to each other. South 
Africa and Lebanon are cases where substantial effort and policy design has been invested into creating 
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a force that will have served towards creating unificiation and development for the country as a whole. 
Indeed, in both cases the army has played a crucial role in preserving the state during its reconstruction. 
This article will showcase these two countries as examples in the context of transferring knowledge and 
experience for the United Cyprus.  
2 Contextual analysis of militarism in Cyprus  
2.1 Republic of Cyprus 1960-74: from bi-communal force to Greek 
Cypriot National Guard 
Rebuilding a security force after a conflict requires more than just technical know-how. It requires an 
intimate knowledge of the target society and its military institutions (Gaub 2011). This section will 
shortly describe the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC from now on) as a bi-communal state 
with a bi-communal army and how developments led to the war in 1974. The analysis in the following 
sections will then focus on how militarism developed on each side of the divide.  
In 1960, following the end of British rule, Greek Cypriots (GCs) and Turkish Cypriots (TCs) accepted 
a compromise settlement that led to the creation of the RoC (Xydis 1973; Faustmann 1999) and the 
island became an independent republic. Four armies were established in Cyprus as part of its 
independence. The constitution provided an army for the RoC (the Cyprus Army), and a military force for 
each of the guarantor powers: the United Kingdom1, Turkey, and Greece.  
The Cyprus Army was made up of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a 60:40 split arrangement. 
During the interethnic clashes of 1963–1964 the Cyprus Army was dissolved. In its place, the National 
Guard (Greek: Εθνική Φρουρά) was created consisting only of GCs and, in 1964, conscription was 
introduced (see National Guard Law 2011). This ethnic change in the composition of the army, 
therefore, was a manifestation of the deep-rooted separation developing during the period (Efthymiou 
2016). The exclusively GC force has fought against the TC community in two military clashes in 1964 
and 1967, as well as Turkey in the war against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.  
The continuing violent inter-communal strife led to concerns in NATO and eventually to the 
involvement of the United Nations. In March 1964, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) was established and remains on the island to this day. Thus by the mid-1960s five armies 
were stationed on the island.  
The differences between the two communities were never resolved. On the contrary, the TCs lived in 
armed enclaves intermittently until 1974. In 1974, the military junta in Greece encouraged a coup d’état 
in Cyprus. In response to this, Turkey, as a guarantor power of the constitution, intervened by launching 
a military offensive to protect TCs and restore constitutional order (Papadakis 2008). However, Turkish 
forces moved to occupy 37% of the island. 
In 1975, the TC community declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and, in 1983, it 
declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish garrison in 
Cyprus that remained after the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus is today the Turkish Military Forces 
in Northern Cyprus (hereinafter TMFC). The Turkish Cypriot community also maintains the ‘Turkish 
                                                                
 
1 The British forces in Cyprus were created as part of the agreement of the establishment of the RoC in 1960, where the UK 
retained two Sovereign Base Areas and access to 'retained sites' in the Republic.  
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Cypriot Security Forces Command’ (Turkish: Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı) since 1976 (hereinafter 
SFC). Therefore, since the mid-1970s six armies have been stationed on the island.  
The south part of the island, which has since then essentially been the GC administration, 
maintained international recognition and legitimacy as the official RoC. This has given ‘GCs complete 
control over the governance of the country in the eyes of the world’ (Ker-Lindsay 2008). Therefore, when 
I refer to the RoC I refer to the post-colonial state, which, since 1963, no longer represents the TCs and, 
since 1974, represents only the southern part of Cyprus.  
The RoC maintains the National Guard (hereinafter NG) as its army. Moreover, the RoC further 
exercises full control over the relations of the country with the British Forces of Cyprus, the Hellenic 
Force of Cyprus as well as, in some circumstances, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.  
Moreover, nine armies have their influence on the island. The landscape created out of the six 
standing military forces on the island extends further to England, Greece and Turkey, illustrating the 
power of external actors in the conflict situation. The British forces in Cyprus are controlled by the 
British Armed Forces. Most importantly however, since inception, the head of the NG is a Greek officer 
and directly appointed by the Hellenic Armed Forces and the same accounts for the SFC head being a 
Turkish officer appointed by the Turkish Armed Forces. In both cases, the head of the army has a lower 
military rank than the head of the army of the respective “motherland”. Therefore, the two forces are 
further subordinated to Greece and Turkey due to this military ranking. The ‘ethno-symbolism’ of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as “children of their motherlands” is strongly and vividly 
reflected in the subordination of their armed forces to their “motherland” armies.  
2.2 Militarism in the South after partition, 1974-2000  
Militarism (Huntington 1957; Enloe 2004) has been extensive in the South following partition. The high 
levels of militarism observed in the RoC have been reflected in the Global Militarisation Index that has 
generally classed it between the fifth and eighth position worldwide (see: Global Militarisation Index 
2015).  
The specific notions of ‘existential threat’ and ‘civilian participation in security’ were shaped under 
the ideological mobilisation of society following the events of 1974. Political leadership and the state 
projected a particular defensive military ideology, which received vast social support (Efthymiou 2016). 
Following the partition, the political leadership used the armed forces in establishing and reproducing 
the legitimacy of the state of the RoC (Tilly 1975; Weber 1922; Giddens 1985). The state projected its 
defensive military prowess through the extensive procurement and presentation of arms and the 
technological modernisation of the armed forces. In recent years, the defence budget has been in line 
with the trend in Europe and arms procurements have been substantially reduced, discussed later on in 
this report. However, after the division, the RoC invested extensively in defence to purchase arms that 
would have established the RoC as a significant military deterrent force against the TMFC. In 1991, the 
defence budget reached its highest peak of 9.1% of GDP (Efthymiou 2017). This exceptionally high 
defence spending was made possible through off-budget expenditure disbursed from a defence fund. 
This was financed by a ‘special contribution for defence tax’. Private companies and the Church of 
Cyprus, one of the wealthiest institutions on the island, are said to also contribute directly to the fund. 
Therefore, this vast effort for ‘defence’ was a joint one by political leadership, a vast gamut of 
institutions, which accepted coercion of the community to invest human and financial capital 
(Efthymiou 2016).  
This masculinist militarism therefore relied on a reciprocal relationship between army-institution, 
political leadership and society. The idea of extensively investing in ‘defence’ was presented to the GC 
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community as necessary for the ‘existential protection’ of the GC community from the Turkish army. This 
army, in the most dominant state-mobilized discourses, was imagined as very threatening and hyper 
powerful. This embedded notion of ‘existential threat’ from Turkey within society was an integrative 
effort by the political leadership to culturally homogenise an “ethnic community” as a ‘nation-in-arms’ 
(Efthymiou 2016). This “nation-in-arms” was intended to constitute the whole of the area controlled by 
the RoC as an armed militarised platform of resistance in the face of another armed event with Turkey. 
Since the war, the NG maintains, up to the present day, a conscription service. The conscription service 
has historically been very long (around 24-30 months in the past). This was the longest period of 
conscription service in the European Union. However, in July 2016, it was reduced to 14 months 
(Efthymiou 2017b). Moreover, men in the RoC are obliged to serve the NG as regular reserves and then 
militia until the age of 55 (previously over 55). Therefore, these particular relationships developed 
between army-institution, society and political leadership as outlined above have created an ideological 
structure that sustains a notion of security as directly linked to the civilian participation in defence 
institutions (Efthymiou 2016).  
The Hellenic Force in Cyprus stationed in Cyprus (EL.DY.K.) is directly linked to the militarism 
mobilised by the NG. Its primary role is to support the NG and they regularly hold joint military 
exercises. Moreover, the Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus - Greece (In Greek: Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα 
Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, hereinafter SADD), a territorial military union developed in the 1990s, sought to 
expand the Greek Cypriot and Greek military capabilities in relation to Turkey. Today, the SADD seems 
to not be in place and is avoided in political discourse.  
Following a long history of militarism, the state-led ideology has become re-adapted after the 
opening of the internal borders between North and South (2003), the accession to the EU (2004), and 
cultural Westernisation of the island. Today these new social and political parameters have created the 
vast public criticism of the NG (Αριστοτέλους 2016, Efthymiou 2016, 2017b and 2017c), and political 
leadership has struggled to deal with changes in public opinion (Efthymiou 2017b).  
2.3 Militarism in the North after partition  
In the north of Cyprus, the Security Forces Command is the army of the TRNC. However, the scenery is 
coloured by the heavy presence of the Turkish Military Forces in Northern Cyprus (TMFC). The 
relationship between these two forces reflects the broader injustice that the TC community has 
experienced by Turkey in the North.  
Whilst here the intention is not to review the military numbers and capabilities of the different 
armies across the divide, it is central in this analysis to say that the TMFC military-power far and beyond 
exceeds any other military power on any side of the divide. It stands as the military hegemony for both 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Even though so much has been said about how the Turkish 
Army has caused pain and suffering for the GC community, what has been often missed in popular 
discourse and international agenda is the suffering and oppression the TC community has endured in 
the North by the heavy, controlling and hegemonic presence of the Turkish Army. As Navaro-Yashin 
(2003) most vividly expresses her experience:  
“In days of preparation for the arrival of the TRNC’s most revered guest, inhabitants of Nicosia woke 
up, in the early hours of the day, to the sound of loudspeakers pointing towards the residential areas 
of the town, telling people to clean up the garbage from in front of their homes, in order properly to 
receive the President of Turkey.” 
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In the North, ‘every-day life’ is intertwined with the militarism of the TMFC. Whilst the military sector is 
a central point of militarism, militarism extends beyond the military sector, as it comprises an 
underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures (Sjoberg and Via 2010). The presence 
of TMFC itself ensures that the Northern part of the divide is “one of the most militarized areas in the 
world in terms of numbers of troops and numbers of civilian population” (UN Secretary 1994). Whilst 
Turkish soldiers, officers and military leadership comprise the military force, its militarism creates an 
oppressive and controlling ‘every-day life’ for the TC community that lives outside of those military 
barracks. As Sözen (2010) comments, Cyprus has been highly ‘securitized’ and ‘bureaucratized’ by the 
Turkish military-bureaucratic elite as, for them, ‘Cyprus should be perceived as part of Turkey’s defence 
and security’. By extension, Turkish Cypriot critique of Turkey’s military presence can lead to 
marginalization in the North (Navaro-Yashin 2003).  
The TMFC are considered the ‘occupation army’ by the GC. In the GC nationalist imagination the 
‘occupation army’ is understood as inordinately powerful and constantly threatening the GC existence 
on the island (Efthymiou 2016). The ‘occupation army’ is a GC nationalist militarist discourse of 
‘othering’, within which the idea of the SFC becomes obsolete and bestowed with little power, thus 
being viewed as less threatening (ibid.). This idea of the TC force reflects the broader Greek Cypriot 
nationalist discourse, where ‘Turkish Cypriots are much more favourable than Turks’ (Spyrou 2011: 
538).  
The TMFC are for the Greek Cypriots the primal ‘other’. Lordos (2004) informs us that in relation to 
the provisions of the UN Annan Plan, GCs reported that they would have not felt safe to live under the 
shadow of the Turkish troops in Cyprus, however small in numbers. Moreover, this discourse in relation 
to the TMFC limits the GC understanding of the oppression TCs have been experiencing for decades by 
the same army. As such, within the GC ideological mechanism that produces discussions on freedom, 
peace and security, the position in relation to the Turkish Force renders little space for the 
understanding of Turkish Cypriots suffering from the same force.  
2.4 Some efforts for Europeanising defence in the RoC  
2000-2016  
In the context of the ‘Europeanisation of the conflict’ (Yakinthou 2009; Demetriou 2008) successive 
governments adopted a policy that has led to the dramatic decrease of the defence budget since 2002, 
which also meant the end to major military procurements. Moreover, the repeated cancellation of some 
military parades and exercises2 shows a relative ‘stepping back’ from a state-nationalist assertion of 
militarist politics. Furthermore, in 2009, the Ministry of Defence said to be committed to ‘a series of 
measures to identify officers with extreme nationalist attitudes’. In July 2009, the Ministry of Defence 
launched disciplinary action against training officers at the military training boot camps of Larnaca and 
Paphos for forcing new conscripts into chanting, what was named at the time, ‘unacceptable slogans’. In 
this incident, Minister of Defence Costas Papacostas condemned the use of certain slogans saying that: 
“We want fighters who can deal at any given moment with a hostile attack; we don’t want blood-thirsty 
people, or people who breed hate and passion” (see Μαχη 2011). 
                                                                
 
2 Such as the abolition of the annual joint GC military exercise “Nikihforos” (In Greek: 'Νικηφόρος') and Greek exercise “Toxitis” 
(in Greek: Τοξότης), since the two were held together, in conjunction with the abolition of the Turkish military exercise “Bull” (In 
Greek: Tαύρος).  
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Another policy development relevant to the analysis is that, under the culture of human rights the 
EU is founded upon, the minority religious/ethnic groups of Armenians, Latins and Maronites had to 
now also be included in the military service. Their exclusion in the RoC from 1964 to 2008 was based on 
the nationalist ideology that wanted the NG to be “purely Greek Cypriot”. Thus, the “ethnic purity” 
claimed by NG in its change away from the bi-communal force (1964) had to be broken. From 2008 
onwards, all men belonging to these religious/ethnic groups previously exempt now have to serve 
military service (see: 2008 amendment to the National Guard Law). Arguably, this policy change moves 
towards a more inclusive approach towards minorities.  
However, the 2016 professionalization of the Cyprus NG dismissed the significance of the above 
policies, showing them to be no more than sporadic policies for political adherence to the culture of the 
EU. Most recently, the NG conducted a partial professionalization, thus the reduction of the time of 
conscription service and the hiring of some professional soldiers (Efthymiou 2017b). The way in which 
the semi-professionalization has been conducted has been illustrated as unprofessional and risky for the 
future for the force (Αριστοτέλους 2016; Efthymiou 2017b; Efthymiou 2017c). Moreover, this new 
policy missed the most significant opportunity presented to shift the military ideology towards a more 
inclusive, peaceful and reconciliatory one. The opportunity was twofold as: a) in broader terms, 
professional forces around Europe provide technical rather than nationalist emotional solutions to 
perceived military threats; b) the new policy was introduced during promising negotiations for 
reunification. Thus, it would have been an ideal time to re-design the ideology of the NG towards a 
reconciliatory approach and set the RoC defence-sector as a pillar for peace and co-existence.  
Taken all together, the socio-cultural setting outline so far will be used in conjunction with the 
cases of transferability discussed below, recommending in the last the part of the report how the current 
context can be utilized to configure and implement policies for the MCSF both at cultural-ideological 
and practical levels.  
3 Learning from post-conflict contexts:  
multi-communality and the army 
 
The following analyses summarize the experiences of two different states in rebuilding their armed 
forces after conflict: South Africa and Lebanon. Both cases are valuable sources providing insights 
transferable to creating the Multi-Communal Security Force for the Federal Cyprus. Therefore, the main 
aims are to outline the special situation of a military force in a post-conflict setting, to learn from these 
two cases in order to avoid established mistakes, and to set the basis for optimal policy design if the 
MCSF were to be carried out. These two countries’ cases are closely related to the Federal RoC, as they 
shared military power by integrating former antagonists’ armed forces into a new common security 
force. Therefore South Africa and Lebanon will be used as examples of best practice in how peace 
arrangement provisions for military power-sharing can specify details for staffing and be used to 
anticipate issues in the integration process.  
3.1 South Africa: uniting many and racially divided armies  
One of the most challenging areas during South Africa’s transition was the transformation of its security 
sector (Africa 2011). Under apartheid, the composition of the South African security sector reflected the 
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racially fragmented nature of the apartheid design (Africa 2011). Since 1994, South Africa has 
undergone fundamental transformation from the closed and isolated apartheid state to a democratic 
state. Internally, the South African Department of Defence (SADF) with the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) have also been substantially transformed combining the former combatant 
forces into one national force (le Roux 2005). The apartheid-era SADF and the armed wings of the 
liberation movement were amalgamated into the SANDF in 1994 (Africa 2011). The challenging case of 
the integration of armies in post-apartheid South Africa relates closely to the anticipated challenges for 
the Federal Cyprus. Cyprus and South Africa are both post-colonial states marked by ethnic conflict, 
where the army’s efforts were such to create a multi-communal army both before and after inter-ethnic 
conflict. Moreover, following conflict in both cases, existing armies had to be combined into a united 
force, moving away from the armies’ perception of being ethnically, racially or religiously divided and 
towards performing a reconciliatory and peaceful mission.  
3.1.1 Reorientation of the security sector: integration of different armed forces 
The success of South Africa in transitioning to a multi-communal army is an outcome of careful policy 
design. This design aimed at foreseeing issues that could have arisen at the stage of drafting policies 
which were attempting to reorient the defence sector into assimilating multiple armies and addressing 
the issues of future defence policy.  
 
New Defence Policy  
The Joint Military Coordinating Committee provided the first forum for officers of the old SADF, the 
armed wing of the African National Congress (Umkhonto we Sizwe, MK), the Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army (APLA) and the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) defence forces, which 
worked together to create the post-election South African Defence Sector (le Roux 2005). A Ministerial 
Integration Oversight Committee was established to manage these tensions and to monitor the process 
and, particularly, adherence to policy. A shortcoming faced was that the proceedings were dominated 
by the officers of the SADF who had more institutional capacity and experience in running complex 
planning processes, as well as a bigger sized force than the other forces. Moreover, MK possessed 
significant political leverage (Williams 2002). It has been argued that this was dealt with by the strong 
leadership of specific individuals, which emphasized commonality in interest (le Roux 2005). 
The National Security Strategy emphasized that there was a need for a defence force in the New 
South Africa, however this had to be “truly apolitical (non-partisan) and professional” (le Roux 2005). 
Therefore, the new army had to be restricted to purely conventional military tasks. This policy parameter 
will be helpful in other post-conflict contexts as a clear focus on ‘external threat’. In these contexts, the 
army should strictly be confined to conventional military tasks, as actions outside of these are prone to 
destabilize the processes of peace.  
 
Integration of armed forces 
The most critical area of transformation for the SANDF was eliminating the character of the 
apartheid defence force by ensuring equity in racial and gender representation (le Roux 2005; 
Africa 2011). The imbalances in the sizes of the integrating forces posed an immediate issue for the 
initial composition. This was handled with concerted rationalisation strategies and fast tracking the 
institution of voluntary severance packages (le Roux 2005). However, although top management is 
representative, middle management is still biased towards white, ex-SADF members. At the same time, 
the SANDF is not attracting whites at the lower levels, causing that level to be predominantly black (le 
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Roux 2005; Africa 2011). This issue can be anticipated in other multi-ethnic or multi-racial post-conflict 
societies. ‘Power-sharing’ at the highest levels is an alarming issue for policy design. However, the 
middle-level runs the risk of being dominated by members of the majority. Thus, the challenge is not to 
share power at the level of decision-making but to deal with inequalities at mid and lower levels. 
As will be discussed later in relation to the case-study of Lebanon, a certain adaptability in the policy at 
the lower levels can prove most efficient.  
3.1.2 Peace support and counterinsurgency 
Counterinsurgency is broadly understood as military or political action taken against the activities of 
guerrillas or revolutionaries. It is, therefore, naturally a contested and ambivalent military action. South 
Africa had to reconsider counterinsurgency because of its infamous histories with apartheid leaders 
waging a devastating campaign during the 1970s and 1980s against several liberation movements 
(Gossmann 2008). Therefore, post 1994, the transition has proven to be a precarious environment for 
the continuing of this counterinsurgency knowledge. 
The idea of creating a specific force that is operationally ready to deal with armed separatists 
groups aiming to destabilize the building of peace can be considered in policy design. Peace Support 
Operations aim to contain and stabilize conflict, enable and restore peace.3 Establishing a 
counterinsurgency that will ‘defend peace’ should rely on strong institutional mechanisms of 
transparency and civil accountability. 
3.1.3 Senior military officers: peace-making education rather than training  
Senior military officers are detrimental to the process of peace when they conceptually remain locked in 
the era of conflict. Anticipating this issue, policy in South Africa emphasized education over training in 
order to break the conflict trap and benefit from development policy (see Collier et al. 2003). Putting 
emphasis on education rather than training for war in the Officer Corp is designed to change mind-sets, 
and to allow a psychological transformation to take place that will enhance the human security of 
citizens, advocating for security as a means for peace (Rupiya 2016).  
Another lesson that should be drawn from South Africa in this context is integrating the “spoilers” 
into decision-making. In South Africa, as often is the case in post-conflict societies that enter peace 
negotiations, not all political actors are committed to the changes needed in the security sector as they 
fear major changes. The case of South Africa, however, presents an example of good practice in the 
necessity of engaging those political actors who feel alienated from the changes in order to prevent them 
from undermining the process (see: Africa 2011). Whilst this situation presented a major challenge for 
the political actors and required a considerable amount of negotiation between the political formations, 
continued efforts were made to accommodate all within the process and ensure its success (ibid.). The 
inclusive approach towards security actors was based on the understanding that cooperation is critical 
for a peaceful transition. 
The above sections have already provided best practice examples from South Africa that can be 
transferred in creating the Multi-Communal Force of Federal Cyprus. However, it needs to be noted the 
transition had to deal with a lot of very challenging issues relating to both practically unifying the forces 
                                                                
 
3 See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, General Guidelines and Principles for Peacekeeping Operations, 
chapter 1. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf. 
12 
 
and promoting unification and peace-making, although the structure and operation-ability were well in 
place (Africa 2011). The RoC Defence Sector at the moment is seriously malfunctioning and defence 
structures are shaky (Efthymiou 2016; 2017b; 2017c). Therefore, policy design that will aim at unifying 
the two armies will have to take their current condition into consideration. The effort then will be 
twofold: it will aim to create a bi-communal peace-centred security force as well as to create a force that 
organisationally and operationally will be able to serve the purpose of protecting the bi-communal 
federation.  
3.2 Lebanon: reconstructing an army and power sharing amongst 
communities  
Several multi-ethnic countries had to tackle the problem of security after civil war, thereby confronting 
problems of cohesion, violence and fear. Lebanon is a significant case with its officially recognised 17 
religious groups of Muslims and Christians and a long civil war. With the political and civil 
administration being a delicate exercise in balancing these groups, Lebanon presents a case in point.  
Lebanon provides a most useful example of a case where power sharing in the military enhanced 
the legitimacy of the state and promoted domestic stability.4 Moreover, the high-esteem and 
trustworthiness the Lebanese army receives from all its ethnic groups defined by religion (Gaub 2007) 
sets it as a best practice example.  
The majority of the two respective Cypriot communities are of a different religion, Christians and 
Muslims. Religion has not played a key role in the conflict politics and the case of religion is 
predominantly used as an analytical lens for dealing with ethnic-differences in the multi-
communal army of Federal Cyprus. Moreover, policy design for this army will have to include 
sensitive and strategic planning on religion for respecting difference, as well as separatist 
elements in both communities that could potentially mobilise the opportunity for religious 
differences to undermine the process of the unification of the armies. Particularly, the Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus should be understood as a key player for caution given its historical role as a 
nationalist agent within the GC community, thus intersecting state and community and reproducing 
through popular and religious discourse a specific relationship between religion, nation and ideas of 
liberation.  
3.2.1 Equal distribution of military power – despite minority/majority percentages  
When the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1990 the state had to take back monopoly of the security of the 
country and give the Lebanese the sense of security they needed to rebuild the country (Gaub 2007). 
Lebanon’s experiment with power sharing in the army, however, dates back to 1861 (Zahar 2005) with 
several attempts for power sharing over the years in the Lebanese Army. One of the most significant 
developments was in 1958 after Lebanon's first civil war. During this period, efforts were made to equally 
distribute administrative posts in the LA among Christians and Muslims, instead of the previous ratio of 
6:5 in the Christians' favour (Barak 2006). 
                                                                
 
4 The case of the Lebanese army is most useful in understanding how the army can take an active role in processes of peace. 
Power sharing in the army was introduced in 1975-90 proceeding sharing arrangements in the political system that followed after 
1990. It most interesting that Lebanon also presents a case of the opposite, thus the introduction of power sharing arrangements 
in the political system but not in the security sector (mid 1970s) has been a cause of instability (see: Barak, 2001; 2009).  
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Moreover, it was after 1990 that the many attempts for power sharing became fruitful with the 
Lebanese Army restructuring the religion-based brigades and contributing to rebuilding Lebanon as a 
state and as nation (Gaub 2007). The army was to contain an equal number of Christians and Muslims 
(Barak 2001), a difficult task given the Christian dominance (especially in high-ranking and sensitive 
positions), and the resulting divisive nature of the army. The lessons learned from the policy aiming to 
achieve this are significant in transferability terms.  
The attempt of transplanting individual units into brigades (i.e. bigger military units) different from 
their religion fell flat (Gaub 2007). Later on, a policy of ‘total integration’ was attempted, which became 
successful. This reform was carried out on the individual level so that all brigades would be mixed. An 
extended information campaign supported the shifting of soldiers in order to explain the objectives of 
the reform. This was done to free the role of the security in Lebanon from any religious connotations. 
This, therefore, created a climate of trust between the army and the population (Gaub 2007). Indeed, a 
communication strategy within the army and between army and society is key in major reforms. As 
such, the Lebanese Army embarked on a public relations campaign, including spots on TV and 
billboards (Gaub 2011).  
The aim of the 50:50 distribution of Muslims and Christians, however, became impossible because 
of the lack of Christian soldiers. To deal with this shortcoming, the equal distribution was abolished for 
the lower ranks and was adopted only for the higher levels (Gaub 2007, 2011). The flexibility of the 
policy here is key, as it was designed to eliminate Christian dominance yet was adapted to accept 
Muslim majority. Given this policy flexibility, the army today has a strong image of being trans-
denominational and professional (see Gaub, 2007 who explains how this profile of the army took place 
in society).  
3.2.2 Respecting religious diversity: creating a multi-ethnic identity 
The imbalances between Christian and Muslim communities were a long-lasting challenge for the 
Lebanese army with several efforts made to address this. However, in the early years of Lebanon 
independence (post-1943), the imbalances between Christian and Muslim communities became a major 
challenge for the reconstruction of the Lebanese army, especially in the officer corps. These 
characteristics of Lebanon’s army motivated its leaders to find ways to bring together its soldiers and 
officers by seeking to create memories, myths and symbols that could embody values and beliefs shared 
by members of all of Lebanon’s diverse communities (Baaklini 1976).  
Today the ‘Lebanese Army’ symbolises for the Lebanese a form of trans-religiosity (Gaub 2011) and 
is accorded a unifying national and supra-ethnic identity (Barak 2001). This successful supra-religious 
policy has rendered the army as perhaps the most trustworthy institution for the Lebanese. It appears, 
following the civil war, the supra-religious policy has turned the LA into a symbol of the rule of law and 
peace (see: Gaub 2007 for extended discussion).  
In fact, statistics inform us that amongst the Lebanese, 41.7 percent agree with the statement, 
‘Lebanese trust the state and its institutions’, whilst about twice as many, 75.3 percent, agree with the 
statement, ‘Lebanese trust their army’. Thus, the ‘Lebanese Army’ enjoys more confidence than the state 
itself (statistics taken from Gaub 2007; see also Azar and Mullet 2002). As Gaub (2007) insightfully 
comments in India also 84 % of the population expresses confidence in the army, when only 25 % have 
confidence in the parliament. Therefore, it appears that both in India and in Lebanon, the army 
symbolises intergroup harmony, unity, and trust in each other (ibid.).  
The role of the army in becoming a symbol of the bringing together of the communities both within 
and outside the military barracks is key, as the Lebanese Army has managed to become a symbol for post-
conflict reconciliation and trans-ethnic cooperation (Gaub 2011). The success of these reform policies are 
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evident in the positive impact on the Muslim community, who were formerly reluctant to agree to serving 
in the army in the absence of a political settlement acceptable to their communities (Barak 2001). It is 
evident today that the Lebanese army enjoys a broad consensus because it is reflective of society and its 
divisions (Barak 2009). Underlying the admiration for their Army might therefore not only lie the wishful 
thinking of a united Lebanon, but also the awareness of the link between security, identity and peace 
(Gaub 2007).  
3.3 Demobilisation in Lebanon and South Africa  
Demobilisation is a policy decision in peace settlements and reconciliation. In Lebanon and South Africa 
it specifically relates to programs created to effect and facilitate the transposition of military personnel 
into civil society (Gaub 2007; Gear 2002; Cock 1993). Demobilisation programs usually involve the 
discharge of the soldier from the military with some short-term social reintegration assistance, often 
including financial or educational assistance, health care, psychological counselling and/or assistance 
in securing accommodation or employment (Cilliers 1996).  
These policies in both cases present best examples in practices, because in uniting armies in post-
conflict contexts a favourable option is to dismiss members of the over-represented group or to hire 
soldiers from the under-represented group and fast-track them into higher positions (Gaub 2011). 
However, this approach risks creating a pool of weapon-trained personnel angry at the new state or 
causing jealously within the forces against the newcomers and resentment against policy-makers. Iraq 
proves such a case where dismissed officers joined the insurgency (ibid.).  
Therefore, demobilization aims at reducing the likelihood of trained soldiers threatening the 
peace process through violence in society and the joining of criminal organisations. Reintegration 
poses a number of critical challenges (Williams 1998) as ex-combatants who have spent much of their 
lives in a military environment need now to adapt to a civilian mind-set, and to be accepted by the 
communities into which they are integrating (Kingma 2000). 
The process of demobilization will be most key in the creation of a Multi-Communal Security 
Force for the United Cyprus that will face the challenge of integrating ‘mass-conscript-armies’ 
and promoting, through a unified army, the culture of peace both within and outside the military 
barracks. The successful reintegration of ‘ex-combatants’ into civilian life will be critical in ensuring the 
developing culture of peace and programs of demobilization should be designed in order to avoid 
relapse into violence. Another issue needing to be addressed will be the inclusion or exclusion of 
personnel who are deemed politically undesirable. The nationalist factions on both sides trained as 
soldiers or officers through the existing militaries is a delicate issue. The Annan Plan referendum for 
solution to the Cyprus Problem, defeated by the Greek Cypriot community, included a demilitarization 
plan (see Sözen 2004). A similar policy will need to be designed that will prohibit paramilitary training 
of citizens and, thus, not allowing ex-nationalist officers to create paramilitary formations. At the same 
time, nationalist military officers might need to remain under state control for some time rather than be 
set out alone in society, therefore integrating some of them in non-leading roles in security-related 
institutions such as the police or fire department might make some sense. The challenge will be to avoid 
creating a collection of frustrated personnel opposing the Federal State of Cyprus. Inclusion or exclusion 
of politically undesirable personnel is always a delicate choice to make, but the decision ultimately 
depends on the capacity of the society for reconciliation (Gaub 2011).  
15 
 
4 Preliminary policy design indications: uniting 
security forces for Federal Cyprus  
 
The involvement and engagement of a range of actors is required for a lasting culture of peace to 
develop (Craig, Efthymiou and O’Connell 2013). Indeed, policy-makers at the Greek Ministry of National 
Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkey Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs will have to be engaged in the process of designing a Multi-Communal Security Force.  
However, creating the army for the Federal RoC, which will serve the culture of peace and bi-
communality that the state will be built on, will depend on breaking down entrenched perceptions. 
Perceptions of security intertwined into the broader post-war cultural landscape will necessitate 
extensive research and policy design, rendering the creation of new institutional structures or 
institutional re-arrangements less challenging. Moreover, political and military leaders and advocates of 
militarist ideology could show a marked reluctance to adapt established cultures to new political 
circumstances.  
A heartening degree of consensus in Cyprus about the creation of a new security force will have to 
take place if true reconciliation and stability are to follow. As the case of South Africa has illustrated, 
joint control of existing security structures could consolidate this accord in the interim period, 
engendering a spirit of trust and professionalism among the higher ranks (see Mills 1994 among others). 
Moreover, the cultural dimension of militarisms in Cyprus necessitates incorporation into policy design 
for creating a culture of bi-communalism in the security force and establishing bi-communal security 
perception in the long-term within and outside the military.  
4.1 Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces and “motherland-armies in Cyprus”  
Only members of each community respectively make up the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish 
Cypriot Security Force Command. Moreover, the relationship between each of these forces on the two 
sides of the divide to their perceived supportive force is paradoxical. On the one hand, the major military 
force in the North is the TMFC: purely Turkish. Thus, they consist exclusively of Turks and are an official 
garrison of the Turkish Armed Forces. The TMFC are claimed to be only a supportive force as the TRNC’s 
army is the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces Command. However, the TMFC are the beginning and the 
end of the military presence in the North. In sum, the official discourse presents the “motherland-army” 
as supportive of the “child’s army”. However, in reality it is the other-way round.  
Now, the relationship between the Greek Cypriot NG and the Hellenic Force of Cyprus (EL.DY.K) 
takes a different route. The NG is officially the army of the RoC. The RoC is officially and constitutionally 
a bi-communal state, however, since 1964, it has been represented exclusively by Greek Cypriots. Thus 
the NG serves GC interests exclusively. This is further clearly illustrated in that it has been involved in 
military conflict against both the Turkish Army and the Turkish Cypriot community. EL.DY.K is 
constitutionally present on the island in order to ensure the sovereignty of the RoC. Yet, as said above, 
since 1964, the RoC is exclusively represented by GCs Therefore, EL.DY.K assumed the role of the 
“Motherland army” supportive of the “Child’s army”. The relationship between the National Guard and 
the Hellenic Armed Forces, however, extends much further than EL.DY.K.  
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The NG essentially relies on the Hellenic Armed Forces for all levels of officer training, for military 
leadership guidance and, in certain ways, for equipment. This relationship was developed further 
through the Single Area Defence Doctrine, SADD, discussed earlier on.  
Thus, in contrast to state discourse, the two official main forces rely on the “motherland-armies”. This 
set of relationships has clear policy implications, which will need to be incorporated into the process 
leading to the creation of MCSF.  
4.2 Re-designing ‘everyday security’  
The relationship between ‘army’ and ‘everyday life’ is a serious consideration when building the multi-
communal force. The strong presence of militarism presents an ‘everyday reality’ to Cypriots, regularly 
faced with military presence of six armies across the island (such as military vehicles, outposts or 
soldiers) (Efthymiou 2016).  
In the South, after the partition, the political leadership bestowed the NG with the most crucial 
political and security importance turning the policy of defence into a vast social and economic 
investment. The successive governments mobilized the community through specific notions of “threat” 
and “duty” towards defending the community. This specific nationalist militarism was exemplified 
through “defence” which has been an everyday consumed ideology, which gained significant hegemony 
following the partition. The policies of successive governments intended to precisely create a perception 
of security intersected with the ‘every day’ level, whereby the whole of the population is involved in 
creating and maintaining an armed defence. The GC collective understandings of security is integrally 
linked to the idea of “everyday ordinary heroes” who serve their military service, then become reserves 
and then militia (Efthymiou 2016). The conscription, reserve and militia service today includes men 
from the ages of 18–55 (see National Guard Law 2011). Thus, “almost every GC family is affected by the 
military and has a ‘militarised wing’, i.e. has a son as a soldier or reserve or a husband as a reserve or 
militia.” (Efthymiou 2016; 2017b). Moreover, the state aimed to create an understanding of security as 
linked to arms modernization. The high defence spending was directly linked to this policy. It indeed 
presented another ‘everyday reality’ for GCs living in Cyprus who pay “defence tax”5 in almost all of 
their financial transactions. 
The Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus have highly militarised the North and, to a 
significant extent, have created a military controlled ‘everyday reality’ for the Turkish Cypriot 
community. As Navaro-Yashin (2003) succinctly puts it: the militarily patrolled area of Northern Cyprus 
is not a remnant from a time past, but a contemporary political formation. Indeed, the militarism 
mobilized by the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus is not confined to the barracks. Rather, the 
whole space is treated like a military zone (ibid.). Through ethnographic accounts Navaro-Yashin further 
illustrates how Turkish Cypriot critique of Turkey’s military presence leads to marginalization in the 
North.  
What differentiates the two major armies across the divide therefore is not the control of ‘everyday 
life’ and ‘everyday people’, as the whole of Cyprus presents an alarming case when it comes to that. 
Rather, it is the influence of the army on the political and state level that presents a different form of 
militarism. In the North the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus have a direct role to play in 
                                                                
 
5 This is a levy called the “Special Contribution for defence tax,” based on the Special Contribution for defence law (Number 
117(Ι)/2002). 
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domestic issues. In the South, the relationship between state, army and society takes a coercive route. 
The political leadership and the state have had an extensive role to play within the army. Militarism, 
however, has been a state-led effort to gain legitimacy and control through the army in all aspects of life 
outside the military barracks. These differences in the relationship of army and society are both 
structural and, currently, on the ‘everyday level’ also cultural. Policy on the MCSF will need to 
incorporate them in such a way that the new force is designed as a state-institution that will perform a 
bi-communal role culturally, both within the army and in society.  
4.3 The necessity of designing a united professional force and 
abolishing conscription  
The multi-communal force should most certainly be a professional army. Armies relying fully on 
professional personnel tend to mobilize an ideology and operation-ability that focuses more on 
technical rather than nationalist and emotional responses to perceived military threats. Most 
symbolically, the Cyprus Army (1960-1963), constituted of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, was a 
professional one. When the NG replaced it in 1964, conscription was introduced.  
Currently, both Cypriot forces on the island are conscript-based armies and, thus, patterned upon 
the military model of ‘nation-in-arms’ (Rapoport 1962; Ben Eliezer 1995). The ‘nation-in-arms’ model 
relies on strong bi-directional links with society. Society is used for its human capital for military-service 
as well to promote the ‘nation-in-arms’ ideology. Therefore, a professional force will allow for the 
lessening of these links with society and for the developing of a ‘professional’, as opposed to 
‘nationalist’, approach to security decision-making and action. A reserve force will probably be 
maintained for times of crisis; in this case the force should be comprised of current reserves from both 
communities.  
Creating a professional force should allow for smaller, more flexible and highly specialised units 
(Efthymiou 2017b) prototyped on modern design; a practical security dimension that should be 
communicated to the population. As discussed already, the MCSF should rely on a ’50:50’ split between 
the two Cypriot communities. The many decades of conscription have resulted in a society on both sides 
of the divide that links the notion of ‘security’ with the large size of the country’s ‘military forces’, as 
conscript-based armies are significantly bigger than professional forces. This current reality between the 
‘size of forces’ and the ‘public feeling of security’ is significant in policy terms. The multi-communal 
force should rely on the notion of ‘shared security – shared responsibility’ that will be touching on the 
need for the ‘ontological security’ of both Cypriot communities through the understanding that a shared 
professional and more efficient force can provide security for all, a socio-psychological need which will 
clearly be apparent in the beginning of the federation.  
4.4 Changing ‘identity’ for a multi-communal force  
Armies in Cyprus have been standing in opposition across the divide for more than four decades. 
Combining former enemy forces so that they now train for each other is a difficult task, requiring 
a detailed and complicated identity configuration formation. In the scope of this report only some 
of the key parameters can be shortly developed.  
Demilitarisation and peace-building is a social interaction between individuals and groups, which 
are shaped by different identities, institutions and ideologies (Cock 2000). Two related issues have been 
discussed already through this report. One is that the totality of identity with which armies socialize 
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soldiers and officers might contribute to subsequent violent behaviour and attitudes after combatants 
have left the military structures following a peace settlement. The other is that the ‘culture of conflict’, in 
which soldiers and officers have been trained, poses critical issues for the integration of previously 
oppositional forces into a united force focusing on common interests. Learning to ‘do’ peace after having 
being trained for war is undoubtedly a difficult task. Therefore, the creation of alternative cultural 
military structures and identities and their implications for peace and reunification need be considered 
when designing policy.  
A factor that future policy design can utilize is the ability of youth to learn a new identity, i.e. that of 
a federal Cyprus. Youth today is being socialized against the background of globalization coinciding 
with worldwide tendencies of increasing transnationalism and multiculturalism among national 
populations. Therefore, targeting younger populations to join the force can assist the process of 
unification and peace.  
However, the main challenge will be shifting the current military personnel towards the identity of 
the new force. The configuration of joined struggles fought by two communities as well as the use of 
Cypriot myths and folklore can also prove to be useful passed down through generations in both 
communities. On this, Lebanon provides some transferable examples.  
Moreover, taking part in some international peace missions (perhaps with the UN) will help to 
create common experiences that could act as a catalyst for a new identity for the united force.  
4.5 Finding a common language  
An issue that may arise in the very beginning of the MCSF is language. Jeluisic and Pograjic (2008) have 
illustrated how different experiences, standards and procedures of the merging of troops from three 
European forces led to adaptation problems, but, most importantly, the language issue proved to be 
problematic. The two Cypriot communities use Greek or Turkish as their main language. Policy aiming at 
creating a Multi-Communal Force will need to incorporate the two languages into design. Language 
capability can engender opportunity and progression of the military organization (van Dijk and Soeters 
2008) fostering a quicker, deeper creation of a collaborative culture in the Greek-Turkish Cypriot force. 
In this sense, culture should be understood as a tool for finding common grounds on language, because 
by having mixed military units the communities will soon begin to build common experiences, will 
improve language skills and build a basis where cultural differences will become a source of mutual 
understanding. 
4.6 The relationship of the RoC to British Military Bases and UNFICYP: 
relevance to policy design  
The relationship between the presence of six armies on the island becomes further complex across the 
divide. The presence of two additional forces from the aforementioned armies in the South will become 
significant in policy terms given that the multi-communal force is to come into place. The British Force 
of Cyprus and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus both are dealt with by the RoC state that 
is currently controlled by the GC political leadership. The Greek Cypriot military leadership and military 
structure being more acquainted with this specific military complex will present an immediate 
inequality to the Turkish Cypriot one. This will have to be incorporated into the policy design seeking to 
unite the two forces.  
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It is anticipated that the UN force will leave Cyprus sometime after the settlement, however the GC 
discourse on security is somewhat linked to the peacekeeping role of UNFICYP. Therefore, this element 
should be included in the policy design transiting the current forces into the MCSF.  
Presently there is no indication that the British Force of Cyprus will also leave the island. The 
relationship between the British Force of Cyprus and the local population and political leadership is 
rather uneventful (Higate 2011). Apart from infrequent complaints by certain political fractions about 
the British military presence in Cyprus not much is said or done, as nationalist factions focus their 
political discourse on the ‘TMFC’. However, the “loss” of a “single-ethnic” military to the MCSF could be 
challenging to nationalist elements of both Cypriot communities and the presence of a “foreign military 
force” further adds to this challenge. Therefore, these relationships between a united bi-communal force 
and the presence of a “foreign military force” will need to be incorporated into policy design. There will 
be a need to delicately and concretely create a basis for a constructive and collaborative relationship 
between the two forces.  
4.7 Transparency, meritocracy and accountability 
Transparency, meritocracy and accountability are necessary components of a united army that 
will well serve the Federal Republic of Cyprus. The whole of Cyprus has long suffered much 
corruption. State institutions on both sides of the divide have experienced high levels of favouritism and 
nepotism. The army is a state institution that has so far been unable to escape these cultural tendencies. 
Indeed, the country assessment of Transparency International’s Defence and Security program (2013) 
has illustrated multiple issues of corruption and lack of transparency taking place within the Cyprus 
Defence Institutions.  
The critical issue with corruption here is that the lack of transparency, meritocracy and 
accountability can easily lead to favouritism towards one community and to rising bi-communal issues 
within the united force. Therefore, the designing of the MCSF should take up these issues with utmost 
importance. Principal tasks of security oversight will need to include: ‘Executive Oversight’, ‘Intra-
institutional Oversight’ and ‘Popular Accountability’. South Africa provides a most useful case of best 
practice and the existing body of literature can prove helpful in the designing of anti-corruption and 
integrity policy (e.g. Ford 1997). Indeed, the more professional and separate from society’s problems the 
armed forces are, the more likely they are to not only operate properly, but to also be held in high regard 
by the population (Gaub 2011).  
5 Concluding remarks  
 
Military integration will be an important part of peace-building in Cyprus. Asking military leaders to 
‘come to the table’ and work towards creating a new joined military force is a dynamic yet precarious 
effort. On this, South Africa provides an example of best practice in terms of the many provisional 
committees established in dealing with anticipated issues. In creating the MCSF, a ‘Bi-Communal 
Transitional Defence Commission’ should be established. This commission would invite experts 
from the NG and the SFC to discuss the size and shape of the new force. The challenge will be less 
one of integrating the defence forces structurally, and rather one of creating lasting cultural 
military-structures that will support the reunification of the two communities, both within and 
outside the military barracks. The status that the ‘TMFC’ will have after the solution is most central in 
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the negotiations. However, the emphasis on the TMFC presently shadows imaginative solutions for a 
united Cypriot army. Policy indications developed in this report call for the formation of a new, all-
volunteer bi-communal defence force that will take into the consideration the security sensitivities of 
both communities, as outlined above.  
A primary issue the two communities will have to discuss is the ethnic composition of the armed 
forces, which is always a challenge for multi-ethnic states and is especially difficult in a post-conflict 
situation (Gaub 2011). Two main approaches have been employed in similar contexts that aimed at 
sharing military power: equal numbers of each group’s troops or a balance formed on the basis of a 
formula reflecting the relative size of each of the armed groups or communities (Hoddie and Hartzell 
2005). This analysis has argued that policymakers involved in rebuilding armed forces in the multi-
ethnic setting of Cyprus should aim at a fair and equal balance between all ethnic groups rather than 
representational power sharing. The issue of ethnic composition in unifying the MCSF should be 
conceptualized as involving not only change within military institutions, but also 'change across a 
society at large, either led, reinforced or reflected by the actions of the military' (Dietz et al. 1991). As 
such, the issue of the army should be looked at both independently as well as in relation to the 
framework of the political settlement that will aim to create a long-lasting co-existence between the two 
communities.  
It is, therefore, advisable to reassure the members of the TC minority group about the manner in 
which the state’s new security forces will be used, and peace arrangements may mandate the 
appointment of members of the group to key leadership positions; such as general, director or defence 
minister. This ensures they will be in a position to warn policy-makers about decisions that might alter 
the future composition of the troops.  
The process of transition from a partitioned country with multiple armies to a Federation 
with a MCSF should be designed in such a way that the army will be protecting the country whilst 
serving as a major socio-cultural pillar for peace and reconciliation. Achieving the legitimacy of 
the armed forces in society is key in a post-conflict setting, as the extent to which the armed 
forces will be able to serve society depends largely on their relationship with it. On this, the 
Lebanese army provides a concrete example of best practice closely transferable to the case of Cyprus. 
Respecting religious or ethnic diversity in the army through equal power sharing is key in the 
integration process. Most significantly, establishing the MCSF as a symbol of trans-religiosity and 
achieving a supra-ethnic identity will be central in the process of post-conflict reconciliation and trans-
ethnic cooperation. Moreover, the case of Lebanon also shows that integrating military units at an 
individual level will lay the ground for the deep-rooted trans-ethnic peace and cooperation of the two 
Cypriot communities.  
The mission of the Multi-Communal Force will need to be significantly broadened to incorporate 
political, economic, social and environmental matters related to the Federal state as well as 
developmental non-military regional insecurities ranging from cross-border refugee flows and arms 
smuggling, to asymmetrical threats in the region. It is also likely that, given the small size of the new 
force, highly trained Special Forces units could play an important role in reconnaissance and anti-
terrorist operations. South Africa presents a case where the new defence policy is exclusively focused on 
‘external threat’ and ‘peace-keeping-missions’.  
Civil-military relations and communication strategy will be key in ensuring all the related 
objectives. It is, thus, also imperative to discuss at a policy level the public image of the new institution 
and how it will be designed as supra-ethnic focusing on conventional military threats. The MCSF should 
carefully introduce into policy design best practice examples. At the same time, given the long dragged 
out conflict, Cyprus should provide other post-conflict contexts with an example to follow in 
transitioning to peace.  
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